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ABSTRACT 
This paper explores the relationship between group membership and trust. 
Specifically, we examine (1) the importance of trust in the decision to join groups, (2) the 
subsequent ability of groups to generate trust, and (3) the influence of group membership 
and trust on a measure of well-being, per capita household income. We use longitudinal 
data from KwaZulu-Natal Province, South Africa, allowing us to control for potential 
simultaneity and measurement-error problems in the estimation. We disaggregate groups 
into financial and nonfinancial and “trust in people” by type of agent or actor. We can 
thus examine whether different types of trust are important for participating in different 
types of groups and whether different types of group participation are important for 
generating different types of trust. We find that (1) trust in local agents is an important 
determinant of membership in financial groups but not for membership in nonfinancial 
groups, (2) membership in both types of groups generates trust in nonlocal agents but not 
local agents, and (3) membership in financial and nonfinancial groups leads to higher 
well-being. The first two results suggest that financial groups serve a role in expanding 
the radius of trust, while the first and third results suggest a role for trust in improving 
well-being. 
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A decade ago, relatively few development researchers, particularly economists, 
had heard of social capital. Today, however, many regard it as the logical rounding out of 
an individual’s asset portfolio. While there is little consensus on a definition of social 
capital, most agree that social interactions are at the core of the concept and that such 
interactions can generate returns to those directly involved and, quite possibly, to others 
as well.
1 
To date, the empirical economic studies examining these issues fall into two 
broad categories. First, there is research that focuses on the sites of social interaction, 
such as groups (including clubs and other voluntary associations) and networks. The 
studies focusing on groups typically use membership and other characteristics of groups 
as a proxy for social capital and assess their association with measures of well-being such 
as income or expenditures.
2 Studies examining networks measure the breadth and 
strength of network linkages (e.g., at the firm level) and explore their relationship with 
profits via information transmission, client screening, and search costs (Barr 2000; 
Fafchamps 2000). The second set of empirical studies focuses more directly on the 
underlying mechanisms through which social capital is thought to work, in particular 
                                                 
1 Recent conceptual papers on the topic include Woolcock and Narayan (2000), de Renzio (2000), Fine 
(1999), and Fedderke, de Kadt, and Luiz (1999). Most of these papers make an effort to trace the key 
antecedents in the literature; commonly cited sources are listed in Woolcock and Narayan and invariably 
include Coleman (1988, 1990) and Putnam (1993; 1995). 
2 For example, Narayan and Pritchett (1999), Grootaert (1999), Grootaert, Oh, and Swamy (1999), 
Grootaert and Narayan (2000), and Maluccio, Haddad, and May (2000). 2 
transactions costs, trust, and norms and rules. Included are studies examining the 
measurement and determinants of trust and the determinants of group participation.
3 
Unfortunately, these two literatures have remained somewhat disconnected. The 
group and network literature concludes that participation has important economic 
benefits, even when the stated function of the group is clearly non-economic. Exactly 
how the groups and networks do this, however, remains unclear in most cases. The 
determinants of trust and group-participation literature underline the importance of 
income and social homogeneity and raise the possibility that homogeneity is simply a 
proxy for existing trust. What remains less understood is whether—and how—trust can 
be generated, in particular via participation in groups. 
In this paper, we link the empirical literatures referenced above by exploring the 
relationship between group membership and trust. Specifically, we examine (1) the 
importance of trust in the decision to join groups, (2) the subsequent ability of groups to 
generate trust, and (3) the influence of group membership and trust on a measure of well-
being, per capita household income. We use longitudinal data from KwaZulu-Natal 
Province, South Africa, with an observation each in 1993 and 1998, allowing us to 
control for potential simultaneity and measurement-error problems in the estimation. We 
disaggregate groups into financial and nonfinancial and “trust in people” by type of agent 
or actor. We can thus examine whether different types of trust are important for 
                                                 
3 Examples include the measurement of trust in Glaeser et al. (2000), the determinants of trust in Alesina 
and La Ferrara (2000a); and the determinants of group participation in Alesina and La Ferrara (2000b); La 
Ferrara (2000); and Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote (2000). 3 
participating in different types of groups and whether different types of group 
participation are important for generating different types of trust. In doing so, we provide 
empirical evidence on the feedback effects between trust and group participation. We 
find that (1) trust in local agents is an important determinant of membership in financial 
groups but does not matter for nonfinancial groups, (2) membership in both types of 
groups generates trust in nonlocal agents but not local agents, and (3) membership in 
financial and nonfinancial groups leads to higher well-being. The first two results suggest 
that financial groups serve a role in expanding the radius of trust, while the first and third 
results suggest a role for trust in improving well-being. 
 
2. THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF SOCIAL CAPITAL 
In conceptualizing social capital, one quickly confronts difficulty in defining it. 
There is some virtue in Deepa Narayan’s observation that the value of the term is in its 
emphasis on social relations, an underexplored area of economics (Narayan 1999). The 
use of the term as a catchall for things that cannot be assigned to other, more tangible 
forms of capital and the varied meanings of social also make agreement on an explicit 
definition difficult. Furthermore, this lack of definition does not foster the rigorous 
integration of conceptual and empirical work. Anthony Bebbington notes “Social capital 
belongs to that alarmingly long list of terms in development that are notoriously difficult 
to define, above all in a commonly agreed-upon manner” (Bebbington 1999). For 
Narayan and Pritchett (1999), “Social capital, while not all things to all people, is many 4 
things to many people.” In response, Harriss and de Renzio (1997) ask, “Does the fact 
that it means so many things reflect the fact that it is an idea which serves as a convenient 
peg for different agendas?”  
Figure 1 presents a selection of definitions of social capital proposed in the 
literature. Laid out in this way the similarities between the various definitions are much 
more striking than the differences. For instance, most researchers agree that individual 
social interactions are at the core of social capital. And nearly all agree that while social 
interactions take place at the individual level, social capital has the potential to generate 
externalities. Membership in a group or network, for example, can have unexpected 
benefits and costs to members, such as facilitation of collective action or enhanced 
transmission of information and reputation. At the same time, these social interactions 
may have benefits and costs to those not directly engaged in them, including other 
household members, community members, and the nation as a whole. Those outside—or 
excluded from—the locus of social interaction, may incur costs from the group or 
network’s pursuit of private benefits; this is sometimes referred to as perverse social 
capital (Rubio 1997), an example of which is organized crime. Lastly, nearly all 
acknowledge that the mechanisms that drive social capital have to do with information 
transmission, establishment of trust, and development of norms of collaboration. 
Paul Collier provides a framework for organizing the literature that adds to our 
understanding of how social capital might function. The framework can also be used in 
the development of empirical research strategies to examine how social capital does 5 
Figure 1—Definitions of social capital 
Source  Proposed definition of social capital 
Barr 2000 (p. 539)  Network of relationships between the agents within an economy. 
Coleman 1990  
(p. 300)  
Authority relations, relations of trust, and consensual allocations of rights establish 
norms. 
Collier 1998 (p. 6)  
Social capital is first a subset of the processes which generate externalities, namely, 
those which are generated by social interaction. It is then a subset of these 
social interactions, including only those which either are themselves durable or 
the effects of which are durable. 
Fukuyama 2000  
(p. 3)  
An instantiated informal norm that promotes cooperation between two or more 
individuals. 
Glaeser, Laibson, 
and Sacerdote 2000 
(p. 4) 
Individual social capital as a person’s social characteristics—including social skills, 
charisma and the size of his Rolodex—which enable him to reap market and 
nonmarket returns from interactions with others. 
Knack and Keefer 
1997 (p. 1271) 
Defines “Putnam-esque” groups as those that “instill in their members habits of 
cooperation, solidarity and public-spiritedness” and “Olsonian” groups as those 
that serve as “distributional coalitions.”  
Narayan and 
Pritchett 1999  
(p. 872) 
The quantity and quality of associational life and related social norms. 
Putnam 1995  
(p. 67) 
Features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that 
facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit. 
Uphoff and 
Wijayaratna 2000  
(p. 1876) 
Structural social capital includes “roles, rules, procedures, and precedents as well 
as social networks that establish on-going patterns of social interaction.” 
Cognitive social capital includes “norms, values, attitudes and beliefs that 
predispose people to cooperate.”  
Woolcock and 
Narayan 2000  
(pp. 226–235) 
The norms and networks that enable people to act collectively: 
¤  “the communitarian perspective equates with such local organizations such as 
clubs, associations and civic groups”; 
¤  the networks perspective “stresses the importance of vertical as well as 
horizontal associations between people and of relations within and among such 
organizational entities such as community groups and firms”; 
¤  the institutional view argues that the vitality of community networks and civil 
society is largely the product of the political, legal and institutional 
environment”;  
¤  *the synergy view attempts to integrate the compelling work emerging from 
the networks and institutional camps. 
World Bank website 
2001 
The norms and social relations embedded in the social structures of societies that 
enable people to coordinate action to achieve desired goals. 
 
 6 
function (Collier 1998). (Figure 2 presents our summary scheme for the Collier 
framework.) A key contribution of the framework is that it both distinguishes between 
and connects the location of social interactions (such as groups and networks) and the 
mechanisms that generate resource flows. These distinctions and connections are critical, 
because often there is confusion between social capital itself and where it is being 
generated, especially as the latter is frequently used as a proxy for the former. 
Collier characterizes social interactions as reciprocal or not, organized or not, and 
hierarchical or not. The first distinction highlights the idea that social interactions do not 
necessarily have to be reciprocal to generate externalities. For example, many forms of 
learning transmit knowledge in only one direction. The differences in organization evoke  
 
Figure 2—Summary of Collier conceptualization of social capital processes 
Forum for social interaction 







Hierarchical (e.g., organized 
seniority within clan) 
or 
One-way 
(e.g., unorganized with one 





Copying  X  X  X  Knowledge about 




X  X  X  Knowledge about 
reliability of 
people  Reputation 
transmission 
  X  X 
Norms/priors  X  X  X 
Collective action 
Rules/decisions  X  X   
Source: Derived from Collier (1998). 7 
Woolcock and Narayan’s distinction between communitarian and network types of social 
capital described in Figure 1. The last distinction generates space for incorporating power 
relations into the conceptualization of social capital.  
The mechanisms (including trust, information pooling, and the establishment of 
norms of collective behavior),
4 in turn, generate externalities such as better knowledge of 
opportunities, better knowledge of agent reliability, and increased likelihood of collective 
action. As with the provision of public goods, when the externalities generated are 
positive (either within the group or outside it), social capital will likely be underprovided 
relative to the social optimum.  
Ideally, one would link data on the social interaction locations, the mechanisms, 
and the externalities generated with welfare outcomes affected by those externalities. 
Unfortunately, it is rare to find data on all of these aspects together. Furthermore, even 
when such data are available, it is unlikely that one could convincingly identify and 
estimate more than one or two of the relationships summarized in Figure 2 at a time. In 
this paper we will focus on one of the locations—groups—and one of the mechanisms—




                                                 
4 The various mechanisms by which resource flows are generated echo definitions of structural and 
cognitive social capital of Uphoff and Wijayaratna (2000), although the grouping of mechanisms differs.  8 
3. EMPIRICAL ECONOMIC LITERATURE ON TRUST, GROUP 
MEMBERSHIP, AND HOUSEHOLD WELFARE 
Collier’s framework identifies trust as a potential intermediate outcome that is 
generated by social interactions and that, in turn, helps generate externalities, particularly 
those relating to reputation. Since trust can be measured in surveys (usually whether a 
respondent agrees with a statement such as “most people can be trusted”), albeit 
imperfectly, there is an empirical literature on trust. Some studies treat trust as an 
outcome while others consider its role in explaining other outcomes, including group 
formation, income generation, and economic performance. When trust is used as an 
explanatory factor, it is typically treated as endogenous.  
We now summarize the findings of empirical economic studies examining the 
relationships we consider in this paper: (1) the determinants of group membership, (2) the 
determinants of trust, and (3) the effects of group membership and trust on household 
welfare.  
Starting with the determinants of group participation, only Narayan and Pritchett 
use trust to predict group membership, doing so in an instrumental variables framework 
(Narayan and Pritchett 1999). They endogenize group membership in an expenditure 
function for Tanzania using contemporaneous trust in strangers and government officials 
as instruments for group membership. They do not, however, present the first-stage 
results, though the discussion indicates the association between the two is positive. 
Alesina and La Ferrara (2000b) for the United States and La Ferrara (2000) for Tanzania 9 
develop a model that links group participation with income inequality and within-cluster 
variation in economic activity, race, and ethnic origin. These variables have been used by 
many researchers as proxies for corruption and trust.
5 The predictions of the model 
depend on whether access to the group is open or restricted. The empirical results 
demonstrate that, in general, higher inequality (lower trust) decreases participation in 
open groups and increases it in restricted groups, suggesting that trust plays an important, 
but varied, role in group participation.  
Of the studies that examine the determinants of trust, only Knack and Keefer 
(1997) examine the role of group participation in trust formation, arguing that, a priori, 
the sign of the effect cannot be determined. Participation in political or economic special 
interest groups may reduce trust, while groups that are not politically or economically 
oriented may be more likely to act in ways that are in the public interest, thereby 
generating trust. Using cross-country data, Knack and Keefer find that membership in 
groups—regardless of the extent to which they are politically or economically oriented—
is not significantly associated with trust. 
Two other studies examining the determinants of trust do not test directly the 
hypothesis that group membership fosters trust, but they do highlight a number of other 
important factors that should be considered. Alesina and La Ferrara (2000a) estimate the 
determinants of trust in the United States and find that it is negatively correlated with 
higher income disparity and more ethnic and racial fragmentation at the community level. 
                                                 
5 For example, Mauro (1995). 10 
At the individual level, they find trust is lower for people who are older, female, black, 
have a high school education (but not more), have lower income, or have personally 
experienced separation or divorce and other types of trauma. Glaeser et al. (2000) 
examine similar relationships for a group of Harvard students and find consistent results. 
They go on to measure trust in an experimental economics game, finding that trust 
measured by the survey responses correlates less with trust than with trustworthiness as 
measured by the game. Notwithstanding the representativeness of the sample, this work 
highlights potential measurement and interpretation problems related to survey questions 
about trust (Glaser et al. 2000; Carter and Castillo 2002). 
For the relationship between group membership and economic welfare, research 
is more plentiful and generally consistent. Several micro studies find a positive 
association between measures of group membership and household welfare (typically 
measured by household expenditures), even after endogenizing group membership and 
(in one case) controlling for household fixed effects (Narayan and Pritchett 1999; 
Grootaert 1999; Grootaert, Oh, and Swamy 1999; Maluccio, Haddad, and May 2000
6). 
Knack and Keefer (1997), however, find no significant relationship between group 
membership and economic performance in their cross-country study. 
Several studies disaggregate groups by their function when examining the 
relationship with economic outcomes (Grootaert 1999; Knack and Keefer 1997; 
Maluccio, Haddad, and May 2000). Christian Grootaert finds that production and social 
                                                 
6 The latter report instrumental variable household fixed-effects estimates. 11 
groups have a positive association with household welfare while religious groups and 
government/national groups have none (Grootaert 1999). Maluccio, Haddad, and May 
(2000) find that both financial and nonfinancial groups have positive associations with 
household welfare. Knack and Keefer (1997) consider political/economic and non-
economic/nonpolitical groups in their analysis, finding that neither affects economic 
performance. They also test the relationship between trust and economic performance, 
finding a strong positive association. 
 
4. SOCIAL CAPITAL IN SOUTH AFRICA AND KWAZULU-NATAL 
Moser (1997) documents the effect of apartheid policies in South Africa on the 
levels and types of social capital, describing two offsetting tendencies. “The decades of 
poverty, persecution and suppression associated with apartheid policy have consolidated 
‘stocks’ of social capital. These reciprocal social networks are strongest at the inter-
household level and in horizontally structured organizations.” At the same time, however, 
apartheid policies have “systematically destroyed many poor communities, eroding the 
stock of social capital.” Recent countrywide participatory poverty assessments indicate 
that the most common types of associations are financial, including stokvels (various 
forms of savings groups) and burial societies (which provide insurance for funeral costs). 
The same set of studies finds that many structures associated with local leaders are 
hierarchical and are viewed as extractive (May et al. 1998). As such, a simple 
characterization of social capital in South Africa is difficult. 12 
Formed by combining the former Zulu homeland and the former Natal Province, 
KwaZulu-Natal is South Africa’s largest province, containing one-fifth of the country’s 
population of approximately 41 million. Though not the poorest province, it is 
nevertheless poor, despite being more urbanized (43 percent) than such provinces as the 
Eastern Cape (37 percent) and Northern Province (12 percent). It is also ethnically 
diverse: 82 percent of the population are African (predominantly Zulu), 10 percent 
Indian, 7 percent white, and 1 percent coloured (STATS SA 1996).  
May et al. (1998) find that communities in KwaZulu-Natal distrusted local 
governments, suspecting them of dividing communities by the establishment of a plethora 
of sector-specific community committees. During the mid-1980s and again in the early 
1990s, KwaZulu-Natal suffered from substantial political unrest and violence. As its 
social capital may have been somewhat eroded by the violence and unrest during that 
period, KwaZulu-Natal is an especially interesting place to study (Moser 1997). At the 
same time, these conditions suggest that it would be unwise to draw hasty generalizations 
for other parts of South Africa, let alone the world, based on findings in KwaZulu-Natal.  
Related sociological research sheds light on groups and trust in KwaZulu-Natal. 
Cross, Mngadi, and Mbhele (1998) find that in the increasingly cash-based economy of 
the 1990s, the most sought after memberships are in savings and credit groups. They 
label these groups “achieved,” because entry requires a conscious decision to participate, 
often conditioned on trust. Other types of group memberships, more closely linked to the 
circumstance of one’s religion or kin group and having less (or little) —to do with trust, 
are labeled “bound.” Of course, these two characterizations represent extremes, and their 13 
edges undoubtedly overlap. For example, while an individual may automatically be a 
member of kin and religious groups, he may also choose how intensively to participate in 
them. Cross, Mngadi, and Mbhele note a tendency for membership in achieved groups to 
be seen as a way of “getting ahead,” while membership in bound groups is seen more as a 
way of “not falling behind.”
7 In either case, though, one would expect to find a positive 
association between participation and household welfare. 
 
5. DATA: THE KWAZULU-NATAL INCOME DYNAMICS STUDY (KIDS) 
The first South African national household survey, the Project for Statistics on 
Living Standards and Development, was undertaken in the last half of 1993 (PSLSD 
1994). Households in KwaZulu-Natal were resurveyed from March to June 1998 for the 
KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study (KIDS) (May et al. 2000). In 1993, the 
KwaZulu-Natal sample was representative at the provincial level and contained 1,354 
African and Indian households (Maluccio 2002). 
To ensure comparability, the 1998 household questionnaire followed the 1993 
version, which was an integrated household survey similar in design to a World Bank 
living standards measurement survey (Grosh and Glewwe 2000). In addition, a number of 
new modules were introduced. A key objective of the new modules was to obtain 
information on different dimensions of social capital, including group membership, 
                                                 
7 This echoes the concepts of bridging social capital (used to “get ahead”) and bonding social capital (used 
to “get by”) outlined by Woolcock and Narayan (2000). 14 
personal networks, trust, civic engagement, and violence. This research primarily uses the 
group membership and trust sections, which we now describe. 
The 1998 questionnaire lists nearly 20 types of groups or associations identified 
through pretesting. These fall into several general categories, including financial (e.g., 
saving clubs and burial societies), production (e.g., farmers and informal traders), sports 
and music, community service (e.g., school, water, and development committees), 
religious, and political.
8 For each type of group, households listed every individual who 
was a member in 1998 or who had been a member five years earlier, in 1993.  
Using this data, we construct a measure of group membership at the household 
level by treating the membership of one or more household members in the same group 
as a single group membership for the entire household.
9 The data indicate that households 
in South Africa increasingly joined groups over the 1993–1998 period. On average, each 
household was a member of 0.8 groups in 1993 and 1.3 groups in 1998, a 65 percent 
increase. Over the same period, the proportion of households with at least one 
membership also increased, from 55 to 71 percent. African households were much more 
likely than Indian to report membership. 
                                                 
8 Given the sensitive nature of politics in KwaZulu-Natal, questions regarding political organizations were 
kept rather general to avoid jeopardizing the interview. These groups appear to be underreported in the 
data. 
9 We take this conservative approach to measuring group membership because for many groups it is likely 
that participation by one member yields access for other members to the externalities generated. 
Participation by a second or third member, however, is unlikely to result in a one-for-one increase in 
access. In addition, the ultimate outcome welfare measure we examine, per capita expenditures, is 
measured at the household level.  15 
While households reported participation in a variety of types of groups, financial 
groups (which include stokvels and burial societies) and religious organizations 
predominated. The financial groups tend to be more formally structured than the 
nonfinancial groups, more closely approximating “achieved” groups described above. In 
addition to total group membership at the household level, we also construct two 
measures for financial-group memberships, financial and production groups described 
above, and nonfinancial groups, comprising all remaining types.
10 Of the households that 
report a group membership, about one-third each report membership in financial groups 
only, nonfinancial groups only, and both types simultaneously. 
A separate section of the questionnaire collected information on levels of trust in 
various agents from the household head and, for about half of the households, other key 
household decision-makers. Using a five-point scale, respondents ranked their level of 
trust in different sets of people, including extended family, neighbors, local community 
leaders, local government officials, and strangers.
11 Then they were asked the same 
question about trust in the media (newspapers/radio/television) and in the likelihood that 
the national government would keep its promises and work to serve the poor. As with the 
group membership questions, respondents were asked about current levels of trust first, 
and then retrospectively about trust levels in 1993. In the empirical work, we use 
                                                 
10 Because nonfinancial groups are dominated by religious groups (70 percent), it proved infeasible to 
explore separately in the analysis the effects of different types of nonfinancial groups, e.g., “Putnamesque” 
versus “Olsonian.” 
11 The possible responses for trust were “no trust” = 1, “low trust” = 2, “medium trust” = 3, “high 
trust” = 4, and “complete trust” = 5. 16 
household averages of these trust measures in two ways: individually and the simple sum 
of all eight measures. 
To the extent possible, analogues to the household-level questions were asked in 
67 community-level surveys, which were completed by interviewing key informants from 
the community. First, the number of groups in each category serving the community in 
1993 and 1998 was determined. Second, the informant group was asked to rate on the 
same five-point scale how much people in general in the community trusted the same set 
of actors asked about in the household questionnaire.  
The analysis that follows depends heavily on the validity of the retrospective 
information collected in the 1998 survey. For example, if respondents were more likely to 
indicate only those groups important to them in 1998, not only would this bias (upward) 
estimates of increased membership, but it might also bias inferences regarding the 
contemporaneous relationships between group membership and trust or per capita 
income. A number of factors suggest that these measures are indeed valid, however.  
When long-term recall is required, accuracy is increased if respondents can relate 
the information asked for to some salient event or period in their life. Certainly one of the 
most important events in recent history in South Africa was the 1994 national democratic 
election that brought the African National Congress and President Nelson Mandela to 
power. Since the 1993 survey was undertaken about six months prior to these elections, 
interviewers were carefully trained in 1998 to introduce retrospective questions relating 
to 1993 with the phrase “just before the first democratic national elections.” Therefore, a 
priori, the retrospective data are likely to be accurate. 17 
In addition, Maluccio, Haddad, and May (2000) present two types of empirical 
evidence to assess the reliability of the recall data for group membership: (1) a 
comparison of the independently collected, community-level data with the household-
level data and (2) an examination of the timing of joining groups. The comparison of data 
sources reveal very similar patterns, and the timing of joining groups is evenly spread out 
over the decade before the 1998 survey, thus increasing our confidence in the recall 
measures.  
As for the trust indicators, measures from the household interviews (aggregated to 
the community level) are positively and significantly related to the independently 
collected indicators at the community level, despite the imperfect correspondence 
between sample clusters and communities. Patterns of higher trust of neighbors in rural 
than in urban areas, for example, are also mimicked in the two separately collected data 
sources.  
Of course there is measurement error in any survey, and its magnitude is likely to 
vary by the type of information collected. On balance, while there is evidence to suggest 
that the retrospective group membership and trust information is not measured with 
systematic bias, we do not expect them to be measured without error. We address this 





6. ESTIMATION AND IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY 
We examine three key relationships underlying and surrounding discussions of 
social capital: (1) the role of trust in the decision to participate in groups, (2) the 
subsequent capability of groups to generate trust, and (3) the relative importance of both 
trust and groups in contributing to well-being as measured by per capita household 
income.  
First we ask whether trust is a determinant of group participation at the household 
level. To explore this possibility, after conditioning on a number of characteristics of the 
household found to be important in other studies, we put the spotlight on the role of 
earlier period trust in the decision to participate in groups: 
  G98 = G(T93, Z93),  (1) 
where G98 indicates group memberships in 1998, T93 indicates trust in 1993, and Z93 
represents a set of background characteristics measured in 1993. (Characters in bold type 
represent vectors.) This approach fits alongside the work of Alesina and La Ferrara 
(2000a) that examines determinants of group membership using factors such as ethnic 
and occupational heterogeneity, both common proxies for trust. A crucial difference and 19 
advantage to our approach, however, is that we directly include lagged trust (i.e., trust in 
1993) as an explanatory variable.
12  
The second relationship turns the question around to examine whether group 
membership leads to higher trust:  
  T98 = T(G93, Z93).  (2) 
This is consistent with the work of Glaeser et al. (2000) and Alesina and La Ferrara 
(2000a); however, as above, the crucial difference is that we include lagged group 
membership as an explanatory factor. In this fashion, we can examine which groups, if 
any, generate trust outside their immediate membership, thereby expanding what 
Fukuyama (1995; 2000) calls the “radius of trust.”  
In both relations (1) and (2), all other conditioning factors measured in 1993 are 
also lagged to further protect against the possibility of simultaneity bias for decisions 
made in 1998 regarding group participation and perceptions of trust. As such, it is best to 
interpret these relationships as reduced forms in which the main objective is to ascertain 
whether there is an association between trust and group membership over time. 
As described earlier, the KIDS data allow us to disaggregate groups into financial 
and nonfinancial. Financial groups are rough approximations of what Cross, Mngadi, and 
Mbhele (1998) term “achieved groups,” and the nonfinancial (primarily religious) 
                                                 
12 We use lagged variables to reduce the possibility of the simultaneity bias that would likely result if one 
considered contemporaneous associations between trust and group membership. Lagged measures may also 
make sense if, for example, potential effects of group membership on trust are not immediate. Of course, if 
a lag of five years is too long, the association may be weakened.  20 
approximate “bound groups.” Furthermore we disaggregate “trust in people” by type of 
agent. We can thus examine which types of trust in 1993 are important for which types of 
group participation in 1998. We can also examine which types of group participation in 
1993 are important for the generation of trust in which agents in 1998. The findings 
might help us answer such questions as whether trust in government can help crowd in 
more group formation (Fukuyama 2000) or crowd it out (Collier 1998), or whether 
certain types of groups generate broader radii of trust than others.  
The third relation we estimate explores the relative effects of current group 
membership and current trust on per capita household income. By directly including 
measures of trust, this model augments the usual approach reviewed above, which only 
includes measures for groups (Narayan and Pritchett 1999; Grootaert 1999; Maluccio, 
Haddad, and May 2000): 
  Y98 = Y(G98, T98, Z98).  (3) 
We estimate relations (1)–(3), instrumenting for trust and group membership 
wherever they appear as independent variables and including community-level dummy 
variables. This has the effect of controlling for the array of institutional or other factors 
that may be common to households in a community (or more precisely sample cluster, 
which may consist of or cut across various communities). It is important to emphasize 
that we do not presume to understand the influence of those factors. Instead, we choose to 
control for them to better ascertain the influence of factors operating at the household 
level without introducing biases by omitting relevant factors at the community level.  21 
In estimating (1) and (2), two-stage least squares (2SLS) is implemented primarily 
to control for measurement error (either random or correlated resulting from our 
retrospective data) since we expect the time lags to reduce any simultaneity bias caused 
by the possibility that group membership and trust are simultaneously determined. In the 
third relationship, we use 2SLS primarily to control for simultaneity—it is quite 
plausible, for example, that higher income leads directly to more group participation and 
not just the other way around. Of course, the 2SLS technique does not discriminate and 
(conditional on the validity of the instruments) has the benefit of addressing both types of 
problems in both sets of relationships, even when not the primary concern. At each step 
we evaluate first whether the instruments are relevant before carrying out standard 
overidentification tests.
13 The instrument sets and logic underlying them are described 
next. 
For the first relation—explaining group membership in 1998—we use five 
variables taken from the 1993 household survey to instrument for lagged 1993 trust (see 
Table 1). This is extremely important for our identification strategy, since it enables us to 
control for the possibility that the retrospective data collected in 1998 about 1993 are 
measured with errors associated with other 1998 measures; using actual (as opposed to 
retrospective) 1993 information purges the predictions of this possible source of 
correlation. 
                                                 
13 Included in their not having a direct effect is that they are uncorrelated with anything in the error term 
that may have a direct effect, such as unobserved heterogeneity. See Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995) and 
Davidson and MacKinnon (1993). 22 
Table 1—Description of instrumental variables 





Instruments for trust       
(1) if household member victim of crime during 12 months 
before 1993 survey (crime)  1993 HH Survey  (1), (3)  2, 3, 6 
crime · logarithm of 1993 cluster standard deviation of per 
capita expenditures 
1993 HH Survey  (1), (3)  2, 3, 6 
crime · 1993 cluster standard deviation household head 
years of education 
1993 HH Survey  (1), (3)  2, 3, 6 
crime · index of activity heterogeneity (as in La Ferrara 
2000) 
1993 HH Survey  (1), (3)  2, 3, 6 
(1) if household indicated in 1993 they expected their 
situation to get worse under the new government  1993 HH Survey  (1), (3)  2, 3, 6 
1993 sum of trust measures (lagged trust) 
1998 HH Survey 
(retrospective) 
(3) only  6 
Instruments for group membership        
community decision-making meetings attended in 1993: 
scale 1=none to 5=all (meetings) 
1998 HH Survey 
retrospective 
(2), (3)  4, 5, 6 
logarithm of time spent in area (ltime) 
1998 HH Survey 
(retrospective)  (2), (3)  4, 5, 6 
ltime · meetings  As above  (2), (3)  4, 5, 6 
meetings · 1993 total number of community groups in 




(2), (3)  4, 5, 6 
ltime · community groups  As above  (2), (3)  4, 5, 6 
ltime · meetings · community groups   As above  (2), (3)  4, 5, 6 
1993 household group membership (lagged groups) 
1998 HH Survey 
(retrospective)  (3) only  6 only 
lagged groups · lagged trust  As above  (3) only  6 only 
 
 
The first measure is an indicator of whether a household member had been a 
victim of crime in the past 12 months. The maintained assumption for this (and all 
instruments in this set) is that this trauma is correlated with 1993 lagged trust, but not 
with current group membership other than through its association with trust.
14 We then 
interact this crime variable with three measures of heterogeneity in the community in 
1993 that are also likely to be important determinants of trust: income heterogeneity (the 
                                                 
14 Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote (2000) find associations between trauma and trust. 23 
logarithm of the cluster standard deviation of per capita expenditures), educational 
heterogeneity (the cluster standard deviation of the household head’s years of education), 
and employment activity heterogeneity (a fractionalization index of the primary activity 
of the head of household as used in La Ferrara [2000]). The final instrument is an 
indicator of whether the household expected its situation to get worse under the new 
government. We interpret this to be an indicator of trust (in government) in 1993.  
For the second set of relations explaining trust in 1998, we use six different 
variables to instrument for lagged 1993 group membership taken from the 1998 survey 
(see Table 1). The first is an indicator of how often the household head and other key 
decisionmakers attended community decisionmaking meetings in 1993. The maintained 
hypothesis is that this is correlated with group membership but not (later) trust, except 
through its effect on group membership. Next we include a measure of how long the 
household has resided in the area, as clearly those who have been there longer have been 
exposed for a longer period to the possibility of joining community groups.
15 These 
household-level variables are first interacted with each other, then with the total number 
(i.e., supply) of groups in the community in 1993, one at a time, and then in a triple 
interaction of all three measures. 
                                                 
15 An anonymous referee made the point that, in theory, length of time in residence and attendance at 
community meetings might also affect trust levels directly, although it turns out they are not highly 
correlated in the sample. In addition to the overidentification tests presented as evidence that the 
instruments are valid, we considered specifications excluding these two variables and their interaction (but 
retained their interactions with the community measures). The findings were essentially unchanged, though 
the point estimates were less precisely estimated.  24 
Finally, for the third relation, we include all the aforementioned instruments for 
groups and trust, as well as 1993 lagged values of the group and trust measures being 
considered and an interaction of those lagged values (see Table 1). As an additional 
check against the possibility of correlated measurement error for the retrospective 
measures of trust and groups with their 1998 values, we also discuss results that do not 
include the lagged values in the instrument set. 
 
7. RESULTS 
A question for any analysis using panel data, and particularly important in a study 
like this based only on those interviewed in the final round, is the extent and nature of 
sample attrition. The 1993 (and thus 1998 target) sample included 1,354 households and 
1,132 (84 percent) were successfully reinterviewed in 1998. This rate of attrition is on par 
with or below those of similar studies in developing countries. Of course, a relatively low 
level of attrition does not necessarily mean that the analysis is not distorted by attrition; 
one must still consider the processes underlying it (Fitzgerald, Gottschalk, and Moffit 
1998). 
Maluccio examines attrition for these data and finds that larger households were 
more likely to be reinterviewed, and households with higher per capita expenditures were 
more likely to have moved but not successfully tracked for re-interview. Despite the latter 
finding, estimation of expenditure functions similar to those presented below (but without 
the group membership and trust indicators) shows that while there is evidence of 25 
selection, the bias resulting from ignoring it is largely confined to the effect of urban 
location (Maluccio 2002). Since we control for community effects in this analysis, we 
conclude that the expenditure functions estimated below are unlikely to be severely 
biased by attrition in the panel sample. Since no information for group memberships or 
trust is available from the 1993 survey, however, it is not possible to speculate on the 
nature of attrition bias in the other estimated relations.
16 
Table 2 through Table 6 present the results for the regression analyses.
17 Table 2 
presents 2SLS estimates of relation (1), the reduced-form determinants of 1998 
household group membership for all groups, financial groups only, and nonfinancial 
groups only. For each of these we examine the role of trust using two measures: the sum 
of all the trust measures and, in separate regressions, trust in neighbors only, a proxy for 
local trust. The instrumental variables for trust in neighbors pass both a “relevance test” 
(i.e., they are jointly significant predictors of trust in 1993 in the first stage regression 
including all the other explanatory factors and community dummy variables from the 
second stage) and an overidentification test (i.e., we fail to reject the joint hypothesis that 
the instruments do not belong in the second-stage group membership equation and the 
equation is well specified) (Bound, Jaeger, and Baker 1995; Davidson and MacKinnon 
(1993). Although the instruments do not predict the sum of all trust as well as neighbor 
                                                 
16 It is possible, however, to at least explore whether the instrumental variables taken from the 1993 survey 
are correlated with attrition—and they are not. 
17 Means and standard deviations for all variables are presented in Appendix Table 7. While many 
variables are similar, on average, across the periods, this masks substantial change within households over 
time. For example, for the trust measures, the correlation between 1993 and 1998 reports for each measure 
are never higher than 0.80. 26 
trust, we include those specifications anyway, as the sum of trust is important later in the 
analysis. 
 
Table 2—Group membership and the role of lagged trust, 1998 
Dependent variable: Number of 1998 […] group memberships at household level 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 











1993: Ln avg month PCE  0.2456**  0.1662*  0.1959***   0.1067*  0.0431  0.0483 
  (2.43)  (1.80)  (2.89)  (1.66)  (0.69)  (0.77) 
1993: Head years education  0.0249   0.0269*  0.0038  0.0069  0.0213**  0.0204** 
  (1.61)  (1.88)  (0.33)  (0.63)  (2.36)  (2.20) 
1993: (1) if male head  0.0967  0.1138  0.0319  0.0656  0.0613  0.0469 
  (0.85)  (1.04)  (0.40)  (0.83)  (0.96)  (0.69) 
1993: Head age  0.0016  0.0017  0.0006  -0.0002  0.0007  0.0015 
  (0.34)  (0.37)  (0.17)  (0.07)  (0.25)  (0.52) 
1993: Number females 01-15  0.0566  0.0415  0.0389  0.0216  0.0154  0.0167 
  (1.59)  (1.29)  (1.54)  (0.91)  (0.76)  (0.84) 
1993: Number males 01-15  0.0622*  0.0819**  0.0418*   0.0623***  0.0189  0.0188 
  (1.65)  (2.53)  (1.68)  (2.85)  (0.83)  (0.86) 
1993: Number females 16-50  0.0722  0.0321  0.0385  -0.0055  0.0363  0.0380 
  (1.59)  (0.79)  (1.21)  (0.19)  (1.37)  (1.39) 
1993: Number males 16-50  0.0681*  0.0565  0.0384  0.0201  0.0287  0.0342 
  (1.73)  (1.45)  (1.30)  (0.66)  (1.23)  (1.32) 
1993: Number females 51 +  0.0656  0.0362  -0.0171  -0.0512  0.0834  0.0863 
  (0.74)  (0.45)  (0.28)  (0.83)  (1.37)  (1.44) 
1993: Number males 51 +  0.1339  0.0913  0.1349  0.1076  0.0128  -0.0031 
  (0.96)  (0.79)  (1.33)  (1.26)  (0.17)  (0.04) 
             
1993: Sum all trust measures  0.1273     0.1198*    0.0128   
  (1.25)    (1.71)    (0.21)   
1993: Trust in neighbors    0.3553    0.4629**    -0.0818 
    (1.09)    (2.04)    (0.38) 
             
Constant  -2.1833  -0.5659  -2.1564  -0.9256  -0.0692  0.3602 
  (1.05)  (0.35)  (1.50)  (1.32)  (0.05)  (0.56) 
             
Number of observations  1,132  1,132  1,132  1,132  1,132  1,132 
             










































Notes: Instrumental variables estimates endogenizing trust using instruments described in Table 1. Regressions include 
community fixed-effects (not shown). Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses are calculated using robust 
standard errors (StataCorp 2001). P-values of tests are in brackets. * indicates significance at 10%, ** at 5% and 
*** at 1% levels. 27 
Average per capita expenditures (excluding direct expenses on group 
memberships) in 1993, our proxy for permanent income, increases combined and 
financial-group participation, but has little effect on nonfinancial-group participation, 
where the more important factor is education of the household head. Since few of the 
groups under consideration have to do with education, this latter effect is likely related to 
the role education of the head plays as a proxy for resources in the household. Better-off 
households participate in groups more. Few of the other conditioning factors included as 
controls, such as demographic structure of the household, are individually significant.
18  
The two trust measures show no relationship with the combined group measure or 
nonfinancial groups, but are significant determinants of participation in financial groups, 
particularly trust in neighbors in 1993.  
Results from 2SLS regressions identical to those in Table 2, with the exception of 
varying the agent trusted, are summarized in Table 3, which presents the coefficients on 
each of the different trust measures for the different group types. (For example, the 
coefficient on the sum of all trust in column (1) of Table 2 is presented in row (1), 
column (1) of Table 3.) None of the measures of trust in 1993 has a significant effect on 
overall group membership in 1998. In addition to the sum of all trust measures and trust 
in neighbors reported on above, trust in extended family also has a positive effect on  
 
                                                 
18 The regressions include community dummy variables or “fixed-effects” that control for all factors 
common to households in the community. These include, for example, location effects and, due to the 
spatial patterns of settlement, race. 28 
Table 3—Group membership and the role of lagged trust, 1998 
Coefficients on instrumented lagged trust variable from regressions on groups 
Dependent variable: Number of 1998 […] group 
memberships at household level 

















































(0.05)  - 
-0.2861 
(0.65) 
National government keeps promises 
0.3227 
(0.95)  - 
0.3384 
(1.33) 
Notes: See notes to Table 2. If cell is blank, instruments did not pass the overidentification test described in 
the text at a 5% level of significance, so IV estimates were not generated. * indicates significance at 
10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1% levels. 
 
financial-group membership in 1998. Finally, none of the 1993 trust measures affects 
membership in nonfinancial groups in 1998.
19  
Using the same estimation methods, Table 4 presents the results for the reduced-
form determinants of the 1998 trust measures, relation (2). As in Table 2, we present the 
results for the sum of trust across all agents and trust in neighbors separately, by all 
groups, both financial and nonfinancial. After controlling for community effects, few  
                                                 
19 Results using ordinary least squares (not shown) highlight the importance of instrumenting. Nearly all of 
them display negative associations between the trust measures and group membership, a few of which are 
significant at the 10 percent level. Since responses to whether the individuals trusted the national 
government to serve the needs of the poor were nearly always the same as trust in national government to 
keep its promises, we do not present the former trust category in the tables. 29 
Table 4—Trust and the role of lagged group membership, 1998 
  Dependent Variable: 1998 Trust in […] 

















1993: Ln avg month PCE   -0.4004  0.0753  -0.7915  0.0577  0.3856  0.1085 
  (0.69)  (0.85)  (1.23)  (0.57)  (0.78)  (1.39) 
1993: Head years educ  -0.0587  0.0010  0.0553  0.0058  -0.1327  0.0003 
  (0.68)  (0.07)  (0.63)  (0.42)  (1.43)  (0.02) 
1993: (1) if male head  -0.8508  -0.1228  -0.7047  -0.1172  -0.6203  -0.1045 
  (1.31)  (1.28)  (1.15)  (1.23)  (0.99)  (1.12) 
1993: Head age  -0.0237  0.0042  -0.0401  0.0035  0.0048  0.0056 
  (0.89)  (1.04)  (1.23)  (0.74)  (0.21)  (1.56) 
1993: Number females 01-15  -0.2082  0.0030  -0.1466  0.0054  -0.1261  0.0091 
  (1.04)  (0.10)  (0.76)  (0.19)  (0.70)  (0.33) 
1993: Number males 01-15   0.0632  0.0022  -0.0981  -0.0049  0.3115*  0.0124 
  (0.31)  (0.07)  (0.42)  (0.14)  (1.71)  (0.48) 
1993: Number females 16-50  -0.3619  0.0262  -0.2175  0.0321  -0.3227  0.0334 
  (1.39)  (0.72)  (0.95)  (0.94)  (1.26)  (0.91) 
1993: Number males 16-50  -0.1738  0.0222  -0.1829  0.0215  0.1130  0.0355 
  (0.70)  (0.59)  (0.67)  (0.55)  (0.55)  (1.09) 
1993: Number females 50 +  -0.8416  0.0233  0.1701  0.0661  -1.3243**  0.0239 
  (1.53)  (0.30)  (0.32)  (0.83)  (2.01)  (0.26) 
1993: Number males 50 +  0.0537  -0.0568  0.2625  -0.0475  -0.2479  -0.0720 
  (0.08)  (0.59)  (0.39)  (0.48)  (0.41)  (0.78) 
             
6.616***  0.2767  -  -  -  -  1993: HH No. All Groups 
(3.05)  (0.86)  -  -  -  - 
-  -  10.62***  0.4546  -  -  1993: HH No. Financial Groups 
-  -  (2.68)  (0.82)  -  - 
-  -  -  -  8.3170**  0.1738  1993: HH No. Nonfinancial Groups 
-  -  -  -  (2.53)  (0.35) 
             
Constant  16.36***  2.851***  17.57***  2.901***  16.32***  2.895*** 
  (4.20)  (5.24)  (4.11)  (5.30)  (4.68)  (5.38) 
             
Number of observations  1,132  1,132  1,132  1,132  1,132  1,132 
             













st stage instruments 




























Notes: Instrumental variables estimates endogenizing household number of groups using instruments described in 
Table 1. Regressions include community fixed-effects (not shown). Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses 
calculated using robust standard errors (StataCorp 2001). P-values of tests in brackets. * indicates significance 
at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1% levels. 
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factors included in the specification explain reported trust levels. Columns (1), (3), and 
(5), however, show clearly that membership in groups of both types in 1993 affects trust 
summed across all agents in 1998. Columns (2), (4), and (6), on the other hand, indicate 
there is little effect of group membership in 1993 of either sort on 1998 trust in 
neighbors.  
Results from 2SLS regressions identical to those in Table 4, with the exception of 
varying the agent trusted in the dependent variable, are summarized in Table 5, allowing 
us to explore which types of trust are being generated. Group membership appears to 
build trust in strangers, the media, and national government, though this claim is weaker 
for nonfinancial groups, since not all the estimates for these types of trust could be  
 
 
Table 5—Trust and the role of lagged group membership, 1998 
Coefficients on instrumented lagged group variables from regressions on trust 
measures 
















                 
6.6162***  0.2767  0.3659  0.1927  0.6282*  1.1464***  1.3412***  1.0379**  All groups 
  (3.05)  (0.86)  (1.12)  (0.64)  (1.84)  (2.67)  (2.94)  (2.39) 
                 
10.62***  0.4546  0.3437  0.3265  0.3526  2.1353**  1.6565**  2.4131**  Financial 
groups  (2.68)  (0.82)  (0.63)  (0.66)  (0.66)  (2.52)  (2.04)  (2.39) 
                 
8.3170**  0.1738  0.5257  0.2204  1.1006*  -  2.3042***  -  Nonfinancial 
groups  (2.53)  (0.35)  (1.01)  (0.47)  (1.93)  -  (2.98)  - 
Notes: See notes to Table 4. If cell is blank, instruments did not pass the overidentification test described in the text at 
5% level, so IV estimates were not generated. * indicates significance at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1% levels. 
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generated.
20 If increased group membership builds trust in these actors, then nonmembers 
can potentially benefit from strengthened norms of trust. 
Lastly, Table 6 presents 2SLS estimates for the contemporaneous effect of groups 
and trust on per capita income, relation (3). Group membership in 1998 has a positive 
effect on per capita income, and this holds when it is disaggregated into financial and 
nonfinancial groups (latter results not shown). Columns (2) and (3) indicate that (the sum 
of) contemporaneous trust does not have a significant effect on income, with or without 
group memberships. We also consider interaction terms between the two measures to 
explore the hypothesis that people who are trusting (or describe themselves as such) will 
get more or less from group membership, but found no evidence of either (results not 
shown). Excluding the lagged values of group membership and trust from the instrument 
set changes the coefficient point estimates in Table 6 very little but yields slightly less 
precise estimates.
21 For relation (3), unlike relations (1) and (2), it is possible to control 
for unobserved heterogeneity (using household fixed-effects) as well; when this is done, 
there is no change in the qualitative results and the coefficient on group membership 
increases slightly, remaining significant (results not shown). Finally, in this table we 
explain per capita income, rather than expenditures, to more directly make the link 
                                                 
20 As with the group membership regressions, ordinary least-squares results indicate negative relationships 
between groups and trust and, for nonfinancial groups, a few of these are significant at the 10 percent level.  
21 The ordinary least-squares estimates of relation (3) are very similar to those presented in the table; the 
only difference is the effect of groups is modestly smaller (possibly due to random measurement error 
bias). We choose to report the 2SLS estimates for consistency with the other tables in the paper. 32 
between social capital and income. Nevertheless, the results are similar when per capita 
expenditures are used instead. 
 
Table 6—Log per capita income and the role of contemporaneous group 
membership and trust, 1998 
  Dependent variable: 1998 Log average per capita income per month 
Explanatory variable  (1)  (2)  (3) 
1998: Head years of education  0.0790***  0.0858***  0.0790*** 
  (6.87)  (7.47)  (6.89) 
1998: (1) if male head  0.2534***  0.2519***  0.2520*** 
  (2.97)  (2.96)  (2.97) 
1998: Head age  0.0129***  0.0143***  0.0130*** 
  (3.87)  (4.27)  (3.86) 
1998: Number females 01-15  -0.1340***  -0.1352***  -0.1344*** 
  (6.00)  (5.99)  (6.04) 
1998: Number males 01-15  -0.1200***  -0.1137***  -0.1196*** 
  (5.71)  (5.40)  (5.67) 
1998: Number females 16-50  -0.0514**  -0.0448*  -0.0518** 
  (2.11)  (1.82)  (2.12) 
1998: Number males 16-50  0.0185  0.0234  0.0184 
  (0.67)  (0.85)  (0.67) 
1998: Number females 51 +  0.0188  0.0243  0.0189 
  (0.28)  (0.36)  (0.28) 
1998: Number males 51 +  0.0226  0.0289  0.0230 
  (0.24)  (0.31)  (0.25) 
       
1998: HH Total number of groups  0.1065***  -  0.1086*** 
  (2.76)    (2.84) 
1993: Sum all trust measures  -  -0.0045  -0.0036 
    (0.43)  (0.35) 
       
Constant  4.7731***  4.960***  4.848*** 
  (15.09)  (12.55)  (12.20) 
       
Observations    1,132    1,132    1,132 
       






p-value of F-test excluded 1
st stage 
instruments for groups (column 1), 
and trust (column 2), and their 
interaction (column 3) 














Notes: Instrumental variables estimates endogenizing groups, trust, and their interaction, using instruments described in 
Table 1. Regressions include community fixed-effects (not shown). Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses 
calculated using robust standard errors (StataCorp, 2001). P-values of tests in brackets. * indicates significance 
at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1% levels. 33 
8. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Our empirical results provide evidence that local trust in neighbors and extended 
family is important for financial-group participation, and that groups appear to be 
locations of social interactions that generate trust in nonlocal agents (strangers, the media, 
and national government). Furthermore, group membership, both financial and 
nonfinancial, is a determinant of per capita income. Treating group membership as a 
proxy for social capital suggests a positive effect for social capital, particularly in the 
case of nonfinancial-group membership where there are no explicit financial benefits 
envisioned. There is no evidence, however, that trust is contemporaneously important for 
income generation. 
These findings resonate with a number of themes from the literature. First, 
membership in financial groups depends on trust, specifically on local trust (neighbors 
and extended family), whereas membership in nonfinancial groups does not depend on 
trust in any agent. Taken together, this suggests that trust operates as economic contract 
theory would predict (Furlong 1996). It is important in those groups that involve frequent 
time-sensitive exchanges of resources but not for groups without this form of interaction. 
This is consistent with the fact that members are mostly neighbors and extended family 
(since the majority of groups are local organizations). In addition, the findings are also 
supported by the microfinance literature, which indicates that membership of extended 
family and neighbors in a group facilitates entry for potential members (Zeller 1998; 
Wydick 1999).  34 
The results can be contrasted with those of Alesina and La Ferrara (2000a), who 
find that proxy measures for general trust indicate it is positively associated with 
membership in open access groups and negatively associated with membership in 
restricted access groups (the former similar to nonfinancial groups and the latter financial 
groups in the South African context). They also contrast with those of La Ferrara (2000), 
who finds membership in economic groups in Tanzania is unrelated to income inequality 
(a proxy for lower trust), although greater income inequality is associated with a lower 
likelihood of participating in political and religious groups.  
The identity of the agent for whom trust is being asked about matters. The 
analyses mentioned above rely on questions such as “most people can be trusted.” Our 
results show that the identity of the person that the respondent has in mind when 
answering the question is important, at least when considering the relationship between 
trust and group participation. This difference may be what underlies the different 
findings. Furthermore, such differences suggest the survey questions are not merely 
picking up trustworthiness, which would not vary by agent. 
The role of trust in the decision to participate in groups is also consistent with our 
general characterization of financial groups as “achieved” and nonfinancial groups as 
“bound.”
22 The majority (70 percent) of the nonfinancial groups are religious in nature, 
i.e., groups for which it is logical that membership would rely less on trust, and this is 
what we find. This does not mean that religious groups do not serve many other purposes; 
                                                 
22 One difference between the “bound” groups described in the text and the nonfinancial groups in the 
sample is that few of the sample groups are kin-based. 35 
they likely do. In particular, many respondents reported being members of so-called 
African Independent Churches, organizations known for their (economic) mutual support 
mechanisms (Cross, Mngadi, and Mbhele 1998). Another common type of religious 
group is the “mothers association,” which offers condolences and other support during 
times of crisis, such as funerals. So, while trust may not be critically important for 
participation in these groups, this does not mean that they do not necessarily have 
economic benefits as well. 
Group membership in 1993 (both financial and nonfinancial) generates trust in 
nonlocal agents in 1998. A possible mechanism underlying this result is that participation 
in groups might lead to greater engagement, and therefore familiarity, with the wider 
world. None of the group memberships, however, leads to higher scores on measures of 
local trust, such as in neighbors and local leaders, suggesting it may represent a 
qualitatively different form of trust, generated via different processes or possibly even 
exogenous. 
Our finding that membership in groups affects certain kinds of trust contrasts with 
cross-country results of Knack and Keefer (1997). Aside from aggregation concerns 
associated with country-level analyses, there are at least two possible explanations for the 
difference. The first is that allowing for a lag is important (trust is not built in a day), 
while their analysis uses contemporaneous measures of trust. The second is that, as with 
the role of trust on group membership, it is important to distinguish between trust in 
different actors.  36 
Trust in local agents in 1993 is important for financial-group membership in 
1998, and financial-group membership in 1993 generates trust in nonlocal leaders in 
1998. This suggests a conversion from local trust to generalized trust; financial groups 
are expanding the radius of trust. 
Group membership in 1998 is important for income generation. This echoes the 
findings of Maluccio, Haddad, and May (2000) for the same households, but it also 
suggests the effects of group membership on income are not caused (only) by trust. 
Instead, the effect of group membership may be operating through some of the other 
mechanisms shown in Figure 2, such as copying and pooling for generating knowledge 
about the world, reputation transmission for assessing the reliability of different agents, 
or the establishment of norms and rules for prompting collective action (Collier 1998). 
Our results are consistent with the household and community-level studies described 
earlier, but again contrast with the results of Knack and Keefer. For this finding, a 
possible explanation for the difference is that the groups serve the function of competing 
to capture government rents, for example, suggesting that at the national level these 
intercommunity struggles would have a negligible or negative effect.
23 
We have shown that trust in neighbors or extended family in 1993 leads to 
increased membership in financial groups in 1998. We have also found that increased 
financial-group membership in 1998 leads to increased income in 1998. Thus, we have 
established a link between trust in local agents in 1993 to income in 1998, via financial 
                                                 
23 This point was suggested to us by an anonymous referee. 37 
groups in 1998. (It was not possible, however, to show this link directly in the estimation 
of the per capita income function.) While it is somewhat arbitrary to discuss the 
magnitude of changes due to the index measures of trust, at the sample means, our 
findings suggest that a one standard deviation increase in trust in neighbors would lead to 
a more than one percent increase in per capita income, via financial-group membership. 
Thus, we have begun to understand how returns to social capital by way of groups are 
generated: it all seems to start with high levels of trust in local agents (neighbors and 
extended family). We were unable, however, to identify any significant determinants of 
local agent trust in 1998 once community-specific factors are taken into account, 




Table 7—Variable means and standard deviations (n = 1,132) 
  1993  1998 
  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D. 
         
Ln avg month per capita expenditures  5.39  (0.73)  5.61  (0.90) 
Ln avg month per capita income  5.04  (1.22)  5.67  (1.25) 
Head years of education  3.77  (3.58)  4.22  (3.66) 
(1) if male head  .69  (0.46)  0.61  (0.49) 
Head age  50.92  (14.40)  53.36  (14.21) 
Household Size  6.24  (3.52  6.32  (3.83) 
Number females 01-15  1.34  (1.45)  1.24  (1.46) 
Number males 01-15  1.38  (1.38)  1.27  (1.46) 
Number females 16-50  1.64  (1.18)  1.70  (1.35) 
Number males 16-50  1.22  (1.11)  1.32  (1.21) 
Number females 51 +  .44  (0.56)  0.51  (0.57) 
Number males 51 +  .24  (0.44)  0.28  (0.48) 
         
Household Group memberships         
  Number of group memberships – all  0.78  (0.88)  1.29  (1.19) 
  Number of group memberships – financial  0.30  (0.55)  0.62  (0.77) 
  Number of group memberships – nonfinancial  0.48  (0.60)  0.67  (0.78) 
         
Trust         
  Trust in neighbors  3.20   (1.15)  3.25  (1.10) 
  Trust in extended family  3.88  (1.11)  3.86  (1.13) 
  Trust in local leaders  2.60  (1.15)  2.77  (1.12) 
  Trust in local government officials  2.41  (1.13)  2.62   (1.15) 
  Trust in strangers  1.79  (1.10)  1.85  (1.15) 
  Trust in the media  3.25  (1.14)  3.47  (1.08) 
  Trust national government to keep promises  2.14  (1.13)  2.26  (1.25) 
  Trust national government to serve the poor  2.13  (1.26)  1.98  (1.07) 
  Sum all trust measures  21.26  (5.15)  22.22  (5.53) 
         
Instruments         
  (1) if HH victim of crime in past 12 months  0.17  (0.37)  -  - 
  Ln cluster s.d. of per capita expenditures  0.54  (0.10)  -  - 
  S.D. of household head years of education  2.36  (0.65)  -  - 
  Index of activity heterogeneity  0.42  (0.14)  -  - 
  (1) expected situation to worsen under new government  0.30  (0.46)  -  - 
  Frequency of community decisionmaking meeting attendance  2.09  (1.26)  -  - 
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